Iran and Saudi Arabia's detente is ongoing - but it is more like a rom-com show rather than a honest talk

How could you define a honest discussion? Well, when both sides truly want to settle down everything to restore some bilateral and commercial ties.

Indeed, if you just judged the outside of the ongoing cycle of meetings between Iran and Saudi Arabia - two regional rivals, also with attendance from other regional powerhouses like Turkey and the UAE, then yes. Iran and Saudi Arabia are really, really engaging in secret discussions, mostly taken in Iraq, once a former hegemon in the same region.

Yet, when you dig deep to these talks, there is one thing should be mentioned: nothing. It's a clear indication of a sitcom promotion show, where the Saudis and Iranians engaging in talks with memes and comical explanations - all to cover the reality that it was a forced compromise. Painfully, but true, most people in the Middle East have expressed negatively about the talks, as none of them believe the roundtable discussions will ever bring the results they sought. So, why are Saudi Arabia and Iran decided to go "detente" when it may not actually bring peace to the region?

Saudi Arabia's reasons

Neither King Salman or Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) wished to reconcile with Iran. It is quite realistic for Riyadh though, as Saudi Arabia was "invited", not actively took the talks with the opponent divided by a water gulf.

Saudi leadership is also well aware that the country that positioned itself in the middle, Iraq, is already seen as a colony of Tehran. The current Iraqi government is controlled by none others but a number of Shiite-based coalition, excluding every Sunni political group. With Iranian backing, they succeeded in doing the suppression of opposition and put Iraq under the controls of the Shiites. Iran also funds a significant number of Shiite battalions, militias and else across Iraq. Bearing this grudge, Saudi Arabia involuntarily accepted to face-by-face with Iran.

Riyadh also knew that Iran has also succeeded in protecting Bashar Al Assad from being removed in Syria after a prolonged conflict for a decade resulting in destruction of the whole country. Moreover, Riyadh is increasingly fearful of the crisis in Lebanon could pave way for the Hezbollah, Iran's most powerful tool in the region, to takeover and reshaped Lebanon into an Iranian colony like how it did with Iraq and Syria.

Saudi Arabia also took the initiative against Iran, too. Saudi Arabia began a massive crackdown on the country's Shiite Muslims during the Arab Spring of 2011, resulting with the execution of Iran-educated Shiite cleric Nimr Al-Nimr in 2016, which was the reason for the breakup of Iranian-Saudi relations. After the Houthis, a Shiite militant group affiliated with Iran, took over Sana'a, Saudi Arabia had militarily intervened to bomb the Houthis, caused a devastating famine and pandemic in Yemen, Saudi Arabia's southern neighbour, triggered international condemnations. Saudi Arabia also engaged with the Taliban back in 2019, which explained why Riyadh has not closed its embassy after Taliban reconquest of Afghanistan in 2021. It should be noted that Saudi Arabia was one of the only three nations, the others were the UAE and Pakistan, to grant Taliban's diplomatic recognition in 1996 when the same group wrecked Afghanistan, and so far, Taliban has not shown any antagonistic attitude against Saudi Arabia. In fact, after a Saudi minister visited India, the Saudi influence was revealed when his visit indirectly forced Taliban to abandon a joint-project with Pakistan to destabilise India-controlled Kashmir.

Saudi Arabia is also fearful of a potential war with Iran that could leave Saudi Arabia armless at home. Although it has a strong relationship with the United States as well as the NATO, but Joe Biden's arrival marked a new era of uncertainty when the United States is less willing to throw troops in the region. When Saudi oil veil was attacked in September 2019, the West has largely sided with Saudi Arabia, but failed to take military actions. Saudi Arabia has a significant problem with the Shiite minority, who are always dissatisfied with the Al Saud and looking at Iran as an inspiration. In fact, Saudi Arabia has to unleash violent repression during the 2011 Arab Spring to quell down Shiite dissidents, which as mentioned above, also included the execution of Nimr Al-Nimr. Further to the past, the same Shiite minority revolted in 1979, before ending with a crackdown.

When agreeing to attend the summit, Saudi Arabia has represented demands for Iran: Tehran must back down from its Middle East project, retreating its armies and proxies out of Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon; as well as de-escalating tensions in Yemen. Saudi Arabia also reluctantly agreed to allow only one of Iran's men to stay live: Bashar Al Assad, the President of Syria, will be permitted to stay in power in his country. Riyadh knew that Tehran is unlikely to follow the demand, so it needs economic clouts to wrestle Iran - something Saudi Arabia has a clear advantage to handle over.

Still, Saudi Arabia begrudgingly attended the peace talks with Iran. Had Trump stayed as President of the United States after 2020, it would have come with a different scenario, perhaps an armageddon for the region.

Iran's reasons

Iran may have been more welcome to the talks as the country was among one of the first to accept Iraqi invitation. Yet Iran's reasons to attend are complex, but largely rooted from a string of defeat Iran suffered in recent months.

Indeed, Iran has been quite successful in exploiting the Arab Spring, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where American forces invaded, toppled autocratic regimes, only for... nothing, if not saying giving everything to Iran. The Iranian regime has even managed to engage with some of its arch-rivals like Turkey and the Taliban to maintain its grip and leverage. In the end, Iran has nearly everything on its own, it succeeded in taking control over Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Iran's other proxy, the Houthis in Yemen, also succeeded in putting chaos for Saudi Arabia. During the Taliban reconquest of Afghanistan in September 2021, Iran did not close the embassy, a quite contradiction to Tehran's reaction back in 1996 when Taliban took over for the first time.

Yet when Iran thought it was on the verge of a victory, setbacks started. Iran found its proxy Hezbollah being antagonised by Lebanese people since 2019, for being the group that benefited from Lebanon's crisis, putting the first crack of Iranian influence. The same year, Iraq, which is under Iranian influence, is also scourged by massive anti-Iranian protests; already in 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections saw many Iran-backed personnel voted out by the public. Hence, Iran's lone grip in the Levant that is still stable, at least, is Syria, due to Al Assad's repressive policies. But Iran's setback doesn't stop in there - it is also facing backlash in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Despite the bonne-hommé with Taliban since 2018, if not to say Taliban officials visited Iran more than Saudi Arabia, and the fact that Iranian regime was willing to engage with the Taliban after its September reconquest, the Taliban u-turned 180 degrees, decried Iranian interference and vowed to cut off any connection with Tehran, an insult to the face of the Iranian regime. To expressed dissatisfaction, Iran's former President, a hardliner and loyal aide to the Iranian Supreme Leader, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in a speech to India's WION, alongside blaming the U.S., had also accused Pakistan, a close ally of Saudi Arabia, of exploiting Taliban against Iran. Of course, Iran reacted strongly, by slowing the normalisation attempt and refusing to allow Taliban's ambassador to take place in Tehran. Iran has also interfered in Pakistani politics, arming Shiite militants and recruited Shiites from Pakistan for its wars in the Middle East, which deteriorated Iran-Pakistan relations.

Just like Saudi Arabia, Iran has a restless population unhappy with the regime. The resentment is widespread, indeed - Iran's mismanagement in the economic terms pushed many Iranians to revolt, but since the regime of Iran adhered to Islamism since 1979, dissent against her is not tolerated. Still, anti-regime unrest remains as for now. Not to say Iran is being seen as a pariah state by outside community, with only China and Russia willing to defend.

In this aspect, Iran has been forced to make a compromise with Saudi Arabia, in a way to handle its already ailing economy, and also, to stabilise its proxies, weakened by numerous conflicts and due to short-lived visions of these militants.

Will it go anywhere?

It's unclear, however it can be answered as unlikely.

As Iran and Saudi Arabia still try to find out any common, wars between Saudi and Iranian forces continued. Only a few days ago, Saudi Arabia and its allies killed over 160 Houthi fighters, marking the highest casualties ever in one day for the Iran-inspired group since the war in Yemen began.

The wound Iran endured from this was severe. Considering that the Houthis have a spiritual alliance with Iran due to Shi'a Islam, this attack signified that Saudi Arabia will not give up even when they're dealing with Iran behind closed door. And there is another problem related: the security of Bahrain, a fellow Gulf monarchy, an ally of Saudi Arabia yet having a majority Shiite population (Bahraini monarch is Sunni). Bahrain's behaviour can greatly impact on how Saudi Arabia perceive Iran. Not just that, some Arab monarchies outside Bahrain (Jordan, Kuwait, the UAE) also view Iran as a threat; Saudi Arabia is reluctant to ignore these nations' concerns as they're Riyadh's allies, too. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is also struggling to solve the messes it has created in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, as well as the scrutiny toward the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.

Meanwhile, for a regime that is so willing to starve the people for its own gains like Iran, the detente is likely the work to regroup, to suppress dissents before returning to the old path. The Iranian regime is very determined to refurbish itself as an Islamic superpower, to have voice and decisions there, like how Saudi Arabia or Turkey have. Unless this is materialised, Iran will not give up, even with a devastating human cost of lives. Iran's relentless backing for its proxies simplifies all the answers. But Iranian leadership is also aware that decades of sanctions and mismanagement led to the turmoil, and if losing public supports at home, who could continue the Ayatollah's legacies?

So, the talk is truly a rom-com dealing rather than a serious question. And this raised us eye bows: what are they really for?

I guess the detente is temporary - when Saudi Arabia and Iran found itself unsafe and insecure, a temporary agreement will be written. But as usual, it is just about paper. What would happen next is only about both regimes to respond. And these documents will be worthless, as we have seen during 1980s and late 2000s.